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Abstract 
  
The European milk market is regulated by a quota system, which is limited by March 2015 for the time 
being. Using Austrian FADN data and applying a mathematical programming model, the impact of 
the CAP reform on Austrian farms with milk quota endowments as well as the impact of future milk 
market regulations after 2015 will be analysed. Possible options include either a continuation of the 
quota system or its abolishment. The model simulations show that in the scenario referring to 2008 
most farms are better off due to the Austrian implementation of the CAP reform compared to a pre-
reform situation. Whether farms are better off with or without a milk quota system in 2015 depends on 
the assumed level of the milk price. However, smaller farms are, on average, better off without a quota 
regulation. 
  





The 2003 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and its implementation in Austria in 2005 
implicated a change in the impact of policy instruments on the production decisions of farmers: The 
incentive of agricultural production shall be less influenced by policy instruments and shall stem to a 
larger extent from agricultural markets, which aims to improve the competitiveness of the agricultural 
sector. The main measures of the reform are, first, ‘decoupling’ of direct payments by introducing 
single  farm  payments,  second,  the  provision  of  payments  conditional  on  the  maintenance  of 
agricultural land in good ecological condition (‘cross-compliance’), and, third, the cutting of direct 
payments and shifting of these resources form the first to the second pillar of the CAP (‘modulation’). 
Austria opted for the ‘historic model’ of single farm payments: Based on payments farmers received 
during  the  reference  period  2000-2002  (‘reference  payments’)  and  based  on  the  farm-specific 
‘reference area’ in the same period, farm-specific entitlements for farmer are granted. In Austria, not 
all payments are decoupled: The suckler cow premium and 40% of the slaughter premium remain 
coupled to the production.  
 
The European milk market is regulated by a milk quota system, which is limited by March 31
st, 2015. 
In 2004, a milk premium was introduced, which was decoupled and integrated into the single farm 
payments  in  2007  as  well,  and  milk  quota  will  be  expanded  until  2008.  Recently,  the  European 
Commission (EC) has been signalling that the milk quota system will not be continued after 2015 and 
is discussing a future milk market regulation these days. In 2008, the recent CAP reform will be 
evaluated within the scope of the ‘health check’ of the EC. For the meantime, it seems that the EC is in 
favour of an expansion of milk quota by about 10%. Possible options for any milk market regulation 
after 2015 are either a continuation of the milk quota system as it is now or an abolishment of the 
quota system.  
 
From an Austrian perspective, it is worth while to have at hand results that show effects of the CAP 
reform 2003 and of possible milk market regulations at farm scale and/or at more detailed regional or 
structural aggregates. The aim of this paper is, first, to analyse the impact of the implementation of the   3 
2003 CAP reform on Austrian dairy farms, and, second, to gain first insights into the impact of future 
milk market regulations after 2015. These options will be analysed by modelling the decision making 
process  of  farms  of  the  Austrian  Farm  Accountancy  Data  Network  (FADN)  database  using  a 
mathematical programming modelling system.  
 
This paper is organised as follows: In chapter 2, the data pool for the model simulations will be 
introduced.  In  chapter  3,  some  details  on  the  mathematical  programming  model,  the  scenarios 
simulated, and the basic model assumptions are presented. Chapter 4 gives, first, an overview of the 
model results and, second, provides additional information on the results of the respective scenarios. 
Finally, the results are discussed in chapter 5. 
 
 
2. Data Pool 
  
The data pool is based on micro data of the Austrian FADN (Farm Accountancy Data Network) from 
2000 to 2002 with about 2.300 farms on average. The IACS (Integrated Administration and Control 
System)  database  served  to  complete  missing  data  regarding  farm-specific  milk  quota,  agri-
environmental  measures  and  less-favoured  area  payments  for  the  same  period.  Data  from  the 
agricultural census 1999 served to dissolve aggregated position of FADN data (for example, some 
positions of areas cultivated with certain crops and some positions of livestock). By aggregating up to 
three farms (according to the IACS database and the agricultural census 1999) into one farm (as is the 
case  in  the  FADN-database),  by  excluding  farms,  which  switched  from  organic  to  conventional 
farming (or vice versa), by guaranteeing that each farm is represented in the database in each of the 
three  years,  and  by  taking  account  only  of  farms,  which  still  have  an  endowment  of  milk  quota 
according to the IACS database 2006, the data pool for our model simulations consists of about 860 
farms. Therefore, the selection of farms is mainly given by combining the existent databases as these 
farms are not selected on the basis of typical or representative farms.
1 Given the databases, all farms 
can  be  assigned  to  the  following  classifications:  regional  classification  (eight  major  production 
regions, five alpine farming zones), management system (organic farming, conventional farming), 
business type (full or part time farming), seven classifications of farm production specialisation, and 
farm size according to economic size units. 
 
Five alpine farming zones (see, for example, Tamme et al. 2002) aim to distinguish between farms in 
mountainous regions and farms in the reminding regions and considers, among other criteria, sloping 
sites,  infrastructure,  etc.  Zone  0  denotes  non-mountainous  regions,  and  zone  4  very  mountainous 
regions. Tables 1 and 2 give a (selective) overview on the farms in the database with respect to the five 
alpine farming zones. 
 
Only a few farms in the data pool are located in very mountainous regions (zone 4, 4.5% of all farms), 
but more than a quarter in non-mountainous regions (zone 0, 29.1%); the remaining 66.4% of the 
farms are located in regions with a distinctive topography. 85% of the farms are full-time farms – the 
share of farms with this characteristic is lower in very mountainous regions compared to other alpine 
                                                 
1 For a selection of the farms in the Austrian FADN database, see BMLFUW (2006).   4 
farming zones. 78% of the farms are specialised in forage production, 16% of the farms have a high 
share of forestry production, only 0.9% of the farms are specialised in cash crop production with a 
rather small endowment of milk quota. About a quarter of the farms in the data pool are organic farms 
– the more mountainous the region is the higher is the share of organic farms in the respective region. 
Except for farms in zone 0 (non-mountainous regions), all farms of the data pool located in zone 1-4 
get less favoured area payments. Regarding the endowment of milk quota, most farms in the data pool 
(39.1%) have 40 to 100 t of milk quota. In very mountainous regions most farms have less than 40 t; a 
high share of farms in non-mountainous regions has milk quota of more than 100 t. 
 















zone 0  29.1  85.6  83.2  2.4  13.6  64.4 
zone 1  24.8  86.4  84.0  0.9  27.2  100.0 
zone 2  21.9  83.5  80.9  0.0  29.8  100.0 
zone 3  19.7  86.4  61.5  0.0  32.0  100.0 
zone 4  4.5  74.4  69.2  0.0  51.3  100.0 
total  100.0  85.0  78.0  0.9  25.8  89.6 
 
Table 2: Selected characteristics of farms in the database (share of farms per alpine farming zone in %) 





< 40 t  40 – 100 t  > 100 t 
zone 0  29.1  20.0  37.6  42.4 
zone 1  24.8  18.3  39.9  41.8 
zone 2  21.9  19.1  39.4  41.5 
zone 3  19.7  34.9  42.0  23.1 
zone 4  4.5  64.1  30.8  5.1 
total  100.0  24.3  39.1  36.6 
 
 
3. Farm optimisation model 
 
The basic model used for this research question is FAMOS (Farm Optimisation System), which is 
documented in Schmid and Sinabell (2006) in detail. This model was adopted for the database and 
modified for the focus of the analysis. In the following, the model will be briefly presented, and 
differences to Schmid and Sinabell (2006) will be pointed out: While the database of Schmid and 
Sinabell (2006) consists of typical farms, the database used here are farms of the Austrian FADN.
2  
 
In  FAMOS  each  farm  model  is  solved  independently  using  mathematical  programming  methods. 
Economic impacts due to reactions of farms on policy instruments and exogenous influences can be 
analysed at farm level and/or – as is the case for the book keeping farms used here – for certain 
regional  or  structural  aggregates  (e.g.  farms  within  the  same  region  or  farms  applying  the  same 
management system, etc.). In the model, each farm maximises its total gross margin (TGM) on a 
                                                 
2 In the literature, many existing models almost exclusively use FADN data to analyse impacts at farm or regional level (see, 
for example, Schleef and Kleinhanß, 1999, Paris and Arfini, 1999, Arfini et al, 2003, etc).   5 
yearly basis, consisting of the revenue from selling its products from livestock and/or crop production, 
operating  costs,  and  direct  payments  (coupled  payments,  single  farm  payments,  payments  of  the 
Austrian  agri-environmental  programme  ÖPUL,  and  less-favoured  area  payments).  In  contrast  to 
Schmid  and  Sinabell  (2006),  secondary  and  off-farm  income  activities  are  not  considered  in  this 
analysis. 
 
In FAMOS, the decision making process based on historical and alternative production and income 
possibilities is simulated for each farm in the database. These possibilities consist of land use, crop 
production,  livestock  production,  management,  and  direct  payments,  and  are  endogenously 
formulated. For the analysis, the management system (organic or conventional production) according 
to  the  database  is  maintained  in  all  scenarios.  Yields,  resource  endowments,  positions  of  direct 
payments, prices, costs as well as coefficients regarding factor use, feed rations, fertilizer coefficients, 
etc. are exogenous. 
 
For calibrating FAMOS, the method of convex combinations of historical and alternative mixes (for 
example,  the  mix  of  crops  cultivated  on  agricultural  land)  is  extensively  used  (see,  for  example, 
Dantzig and Wolfe, 1961; McCarl, 1982). For each farm the resource endowments of land, livestock, 
and milk quota are considered – in contrast to Schmid and Sinabell (2006), labour endowments are not 
taken  into  account.  Generally,  resource  demand for  production  has  to  be  less  than  or  equal  their 
resource endowments. Each farm model can choose regarding its land categories (e.g. arable land, 
forests, etc.) and its crop production on each land category from three years in the database. In contrast 
to  Schmid  and  Sinabell  (2006),  livestock  production  is  determined  by  the  three-year  average  of 
livestock  endowments.  The  output  of  crop  production  can  be  either  sold  or  used  as  forage.  For 
livestock  production,  young  animals  can  be  purchased.  Fertilizer  can  be  produced  on  farm  or 
purchased as well. Like in Schmid and Sinabell (2006), technology and costs of farm activities are 
based on Standard Gross Margins (BMLFUW, 2002a, 2002b and 200c). 
 
Due to the static nature of the model all scenarios were calculated independently from each other using 
GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System). The following scenarios are considered: 
 
1)  base-run 
The base-run simulates an average situation before the implementation of the decisions of the  
2003 CAP-reform (2000 and 2002). This is the reference period for calculating reference hectares 
and single farm entitlements per hectare. 
2)  scenario 2008 
This scenario represents the CAP-reform 2003 (including the milk market reform): single farm 
payments are implemented; a milk premium is introduced and decoupled. Milk quota endowments 
at farm level are reflected by the IACS data according to 2006 and are expanded by 1.76%. 
Afforestation  on  agricultural  land  is  not  allowed  (cross  compliance);  a  modulation  of  5%  is 
considered. 
3)  scenario 2015 – continuation of milk quota system 
In this scenario we assume that the milk quota system will continue. Milk quota endowments at 
farm level are the same as in scenario 2008. 
4)  scenario 2015 – abolition of milk quota system   6 
In this scenario we assume that there is no milk quota system in place, such that the milk quota at 
farm-level  of  2008  is  not  binding  anymore.  Both  scenarios  representing  the  year  2015  are 
calculated with two different assumptions concerning the level of the milk price (‘high’ and ‘low’ 
milk price) 
 
Before turning to the comparative static analysis of the simulations, some fundamental assumptions 
have to be mentioned: All scenarios have been calculated under the assumption of the Austrian agri-
environmental programme ÖPUL 2000-2006; the recent programme from 2007 onwards (with slightly 
different measures farms can choose from) is not considered. Product and factor prices as well as 
prices for fertilizers and  forage  have  been  adjusted in  the  scenarios  2008  and  2015  according  to 
assumptions  of  the  Austrian  Institute  of  Economic  Research  (WIFO),  based  on  OECD/FAO 
projections (see Rosenwirth and Sinabell, 2007). The milk prices in the simulations are as follows 
(milk price A-quota, 4.2% fat and 2.4% protein, exclusive of VAT): 
 
-  base run:    0.315 Euros/kg 
-  2008:      0.336 Euros/kg 
-  2015 - quota:    0.315 Euros/kg (high level), 0.296 Euros/kg (low level) 
-  2015 – no quota:  0.296 Euros/kg (high level), 0.266 Euros/kg (low level) 
 
The milk price for milk from D-quotas is assumed to be 110% of the price for milk from A-quotas, the 
price wedge between organic and conventional milk is assumed to be 15%. The price for milk which 
exceeds  the  quota  at  farm  level  is  assumed  to  be  60%  of  the  price  for  milk  from  A-quotas. 
Consequently,  we  assume  a  super  levy  of  40%  of the  price  for  milk  from  A-quotas.  Due to  the 
decoupling of the milk premium in 2007, the milk quota of farms in scenarios 2008 and 2015 is given 
by the IACS data of 2006 plus 1.76% (i.e. quota expansion according to the milk market reform). 
Most of the farms have purchased additional quota between 2002 and 2006 such that the quota at farm 
level increases by 16.4 % on average. If farms increased their endowment of quota between 2002 and 
2006, quota costs of 0.12 Euro/kg were considered in the scenario 2008. 
 
Milk yields per cow are based on farm-level data (average 2000-2002) and are increased by 1% per 
year. The endowment of livestock is constant for all scenarios, only the endowment of milk cows and 
calves for 2008 (and consequently, for 2015) was exogenously adjusted based on the farm level quota 
of 2008, based on the ratio calves/cow in the base-run and by taking account of a maximum stocking 
of 2 livestock manure units/hectare. Yields of crop production are constant for all scenarios. The 
markets for land and milk quotas are not considered in the model so far. In the scenarios 2008 and 
2015,  a  modulation  of  5%  for  direct  payments  (coupled  payments  plus  single  farm  payments) 
exceeding the threshold of 5.000 Euros was taken into account. 
 
 
4. Scenario results 
 
4.1. Reference Area and Single Farm Payments per Hectare 
    7 
The reference period for calculating reference hectares and single farm payments per hectare is 2000 
to 2002, which is represented by the base-run. For the farms in the data pool, the mean of reference 
hectares is 32.3 ha (median = 25.2 ha), the mean of the single farm payments per hectare is 281.3 
Euros/ha (median = 289.8 Euros/ha). Figure 1 shows the frequencies of single farm payments per 
hectare: 
 











































mean = 281.3 Euros/ha
 
For most of the organic farms (69.4%), but only for 38.8% of the conventional farms in the data pool 
single farm payments per hectare are lower than the mean of 281.3 Euros/ha. The same applies to 
89.7% of the farms in alpine farming zone 4 (very mountainous regions), but only to 20.0% of the 
farms  in  zone  0  (non-mountainous  regions).  The  smaller  the  farms  are  in  terms  of  milk  quota 
endowments, the higher the share of farms with lower single farm payments per hectare: 75.6% of the 
farms with less than 40 t of milk quota, 51.2% of the farms with 40-100 t, and 22.6% of the farms with 
more  than  100  t  of  milk  quota  have  lower  single  farm  payments  per  hectare.  Regarding  the 
specialisation  of  farms,  40.1%  of  farms  specialised  in  forage  production  and  12.5%  of  farms 
specialised in cash crop production have lower single farm payments than the average. 
 
4.2. Overview of Model Results 
 
Before turning to the results of the scenarios in detail, an overview is given in table 3: In 2008, TGMs 
are on average higher, compared to the base run. This is the effect of an average increase in milk quota 
at farm level (+16.4%) and milk yields per cow, changes in prices and costs, the implementation of the 
2003  CAP  reform  (decoupling,  modulation,  and  cross-compliance),  the  introduction  of  the  milk 
premium, and optimal adjustments of farms to these changes. Most farms are better off compared to 
the base-run, which is indicated by a positive median. In 2015, TGMs are, on average, higher without   8 
a quota than with a quota regulation for the assumption of a high milk price (+0.9%). Assuming a low 
milk price, farms are better off on average if the quota regulation will be continued. 
 
Table 3. Mean and median on the distribution of changes in TGMs (in %) 
Scenarios:  mean  median 
2008 vs. base-run  +17.3  +16.9 
2015 high milk price:     
2015 (quota) vs. 2008  +0.5  -0.5 
2015 (no quota) vs. 2008  +1.4  +0.8 
2015 (no quota) vs. 2015 (quota)  +0.9  +0.7 
2015 low milk price:     
2015 (quota) vs. 2008  -3.1  -3.5 
2015 (no quota) vs. 2008  -4.5  -4.7 
2015 (no quota) vs. 2015 (quota)  -1.5  -1.4 
 
4.3. Scenario 2008 compared to base-run 
 
Scenario 2008 represents the situation of a fully implemented CAP-reform (including the milk market 
reform). Milk yields per cow at farm level increase by 6% compared to the base-run, and milk prices 
increase  according  to  the  assumptions;  milk  quota  at  farm  level  increase  by  16.4%  on  average. 
Compared to the base-run (a situation before the CAP-reform) TGMs increase by 17.3% on average. 
Most farms in the data pool are better of as indicated by the median of +16.9%. Table 4 shows the 
results for certain regional and structural characteristics: 
 
Table 4. Statistics on the distribution of changes in TGMs (scenario 2008 compared to base-run) 
  % of farms of 
total sample 
mean (in %)  median (in %) 
total sample    +17.3  +16.9 
alpine farming zones:       
zone 0  29.1  +18.4  +18.8 
zone 1  24.8  +17.9  +16.7 
zone 2  21.9  +18.5  +17.9 
zone 3  19.7  +15.0  +14.1 
zone 4  4.5  +10.3  +8.5 
specialisation:       
Forage production  78.0  +18.7  +18.4 
Cash grain production  0.9  +10.0  +9.4 
milk quota:       
< 40 t  24.3  +6.6  +9.1 
40 – 100 t  39.1  +16.7  +15.7 
> 100 t  36.6  +24.9  +23.5 
management system:       
conventional farms  74.2  +18.5  +18.4 
organic farms  25.8  +13.7  +13.4 
   9 
Increases in TGMs are lower in mountainous regions than in non-mountainous regions (zone 0) and 
lower for organic than for conventional farms; most of the farms in mountainous regions have less 
milk quota and produce organic. For smaller farms with a milk quota of less than 40 t increases in 
TGMs are moderate (+6.6%) compared to farms with a high endowment of milk quota. On average, 
small farms have a lower quota endowment in 2008 compared to the base-run (-7%), whereas farms 
with more than 40 t have a higher quota endowment (for example, for farms with more than 100 t the 
farm-specific quota increases by 32% on average).  
 
4.4. Scenario 2015 (with quota) compared to scenario 2008 
 
Assuming that in 2015 the milk quota regulation continues, milk prices are – by assumption – lower 
than in scenario 2008. Milk yields per cow are assumed to further increase by 1% per year, the quota 
endowment at farm-level equals the level of scenario 2008. In comparison with scenario 2008, TGMs 
increase by 0.5% on average assuming a high milk price in 2015 and decrease by -3.5% on average 
assuming a low milk price (see table 5). However, most farms in the data pool are worse off for both 
price assumptions. 
 
Table 5. Statistics on the distribution of changes in TGMs (scenario 2015 with a quota regulation 
compared to scenario 2008) 
    high milk price  low milk price 
  % of 
farms of 
char. 
mean (in %)  median (in %)  mean (in %)  median (in %) 
total sample    +0.5  -0.5  -3.1  -3.5 
alpine farming zones:           
zone 0  29.1  -0.1  -1.2  -3.8  -4.9 
zone 1  24.8  +0.1  0.0  -0.8  0.0 
zone 2  21.9  +0.2  0.0  -0.6  0.0 
zone 3  19.7  +0.2  0.0  -0.4  0.0 
zone 4  4.5  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0 
specialisation:           
Forage production  78.0  +0.7  -0.4  -3.1  -3.7 
Cash grain production  0.9  -2.2  -2.7  -4.5  -5.3 
milk quota:           
< 40 t  24.3  -1.2  -1.2  -3.4  -3.1 
40 – 100 t  39.1  -0.3  -0.9  -3.8  -4.0 
> 100 t  36.6  +2.5  +1.7  -2.0  -2.8 
management system:           
conventional farms  74.2  +0.7  -0.3  -3.0  -3.5 
organic farms  25.8  -0.2  -0.8  -3.3  -3.6 
 
While TGMs for most of the farms in non-mountainous regions (zone 0) decrease on average, farms in 
mountainous regions are slightly better off on average for high milk prices, but worse off on average 
for  low  milk-prices.  Most  farms  specialised  in  forage  production  have  lower  TGMs  for  both 
assumptions on the level of the milk price. Most of the smaller farms with a milk quota of less than 
100 t are worse off compared to 2008, only larger farms are better off on average assuming a high 
milk price. One reason for this is that average milk yields per cow are higher for larger farms than for   10 
smaller farms. Assuming a high milk price, only conventional farms with higher average milk yields 
per cow than organic farms are better off compared to 2008.  
 
4.5. Scenario 2015 (without quota) compared to scenario 2015 (with quota) 
 
Assuming an abolishment of the quota system in 2015, changes in TGMs in comparison with the 
results for a continuation of the quota system in 2015 are given in table 6: 
 
Table 6. Statistics on the distribution of changes in TGMs (scenario 2015 without a quota system 
compared to scenario 2015 with a quota system) 
    high milk price  low milk price 




















total sample    +0.9  +0.7  +393  -1.5  -1.4  -1.197 
alpine farming zones:               
zone 0  29.1  +0.6  +0.3  +135  -2.0  -1.7  -1.562 
zone 1  24.8  +0.2  0.0  +101  -0.4  0.0  -312 
zone 2  21.9  +0.2  0.0  +90  -0.4  0.0  -315 
zone 3  19.7  +0.3  0.0  +133  -0.2  0.0  -110 
zone 4  4.5  +0.1  0.0  +30  0.0  0.0  -5 
specialisation:               
Forage production  78.0  +0.9  +0.7  +328  -1.7  -1.7  -1.367 
Cash grain production  0.9  +0.5  +0.4  +70  -1.1  -0.9  -878 
milk quota:               
< 40 t  24.3  +1.6  +1.1  +538  0.0  -0.2  +71 
40 – 100 t  39.1  +1.4  +1.2  +808  -1.1  -1.1  -476 
> 100 t  36.6  -0.1  -0.1  -149  -3.0  -3.0  -2.812 
management system:               
conventional farms  74.2  +1.1  +0.8  +475  -1.4  -1.4  -1.170 
organic farms  25.8  +0.4  +0.5  +155  -1.7  -1.4  -1.273 
 
In scenario 2015 without a quota system, milk prices are assumed to be lower than for scenario 2015 
with a continuation of the quota system. Differences in TGMs between these two scenarios are quite 
moderate. However, for the assumption of high milk prices, TGMs are by 0.9% higher, on average, 
without a quota regulation compared to the situation with a quota regulation (most farms are better 
off); for the assumption of low milk prices TGMs are, on average, by -1.5% lower on average (most 
farms are worse off). For a high level of milk prices in 2015, especially smaller farms (with a quota up 
to 100 t at farm level) have higher TGMs, on average, without a quota regulation; larger farms have 
lower TGMs on average. Assuming a low level of milk prices, there is no difference on average for 
small  farms  whether  there  is  a  quota  regulation  in  place  or  not;  most  big  farms  are  worse  off. 
Conventional farms gain more (loose less) on average from an abolition of the quota system than 
organic farms. From a regional point of view, positives (negative) changes in TGMs are highest for 
farms  in  non-mountainous  regions,  but  almost  zero  for  farms  in  very  mountainous  regions.  One   11 
explanation for smaller farms having higher TGMs without a quota regulation than with a quota in 
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Figure 2. Changes in TGMs (2015 without quota vs. quota) in relation to the share of milk production 
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Figure 3. Changes in TGMs (2015 without quota vs. with quota) in relation to the share of milk 
production exceeding the quota on total milk production – high milk price   12 
For the assumption of a high (low) milk price, farms, whose milk production exceeding the quota is 
more than about 15% (25%) of their total milk production, are better off without a quota regulation 
compared to a situation with a quota regulation in place (changes in TGMs are positive).
3 Figure 2 (for 
a high milk price) shows that especially for small farms with a quota of less than 40 t, the share of 
milk production exceeding the quota is relatively high in contrast to larger farms: On average, excess 
production beyond the quota for smaller farms (quota of less than 40 t) is 24.8% of total production, 
for farms with 40 to 100 t 19.9% and for farms with more than 100 t 15.1%.
4 Without a quota, the 
super levy on excess production (and, thus, a lower price for milk beyond the quota) becomes invalid. 
On average and assuming a high milk price, revenues from milk production are 4.1% higher without a 
quota than with a quota for farms with less than 40 t (for farms with 40-100t: mean = +2.4%, for farms 
with more than 100t: mean = 0%). 
 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
One  aim  of  the  2003  CAP  reform  with  its  main  instruments  decoupling,  modulation  and  cross-
compliance is to lessen the extent by which production incentives of farmers are influenced by policy 
instruments. The main incentives shall be provided by agricultural markets themselves. The quota 
regulation of the European milk market is limited by March 31
st, 2015, and the European Commission 
has been signalling that the milk quota system will not be continued after 2015. In 2008, the recent 
CAP reform will be evaluated within the scope of the ‘health check’ of the EC. Possible options for 
any  regulation  after  2015  are  either  a  continuation  of  the  milk  quota  system  as  it  is  now  or  an 
abolishment of quota.  
 
To gain first insights into the impact of possible future milk market regulations on Austrian dairy 
farms,  the  Farm  Optimisation  System  FAMOS  (Schmid  and  Sinabell,  2006)  was  adopted  and 
modified. Using Austrian FADN (Farm Accountancy data network) data, we, first, analyse the impact 
of the CAP reform 2003 and the full implementation of the milk market reform. Second, we compare 
the results of a situation with a milk quota and of a situation with no milk quota in 2015. 
 
The data pool is based on micro data of the Austrian FADN from 2000 to 2002, which is completed by 
IACS data and data from the agricultural census 1999. Taking account only of FADN farms, which 
have an endowment of milk quota according to the IACS database of 2006, the data pool consists of 
about 860 farms. 4.5% of the farms in the data pool are located in very mountainous regions with a 
small endowment of milk quota, more than a quarter are located in non-mountainous regions with a 
high share of farms having more than 100 t of milk quota. Most of the farms are part-time farms, 
which are specialised in forage production; a quarter of the farms produces organic. 
 
The static model maximises total gross margins (TGM) on a yearly basis for each farm, consisting of 
revenues from selling livestock and crop production, operating costs, and direct payments (coupled 
                                                 
3 This result is independent of the underlying assumption of increases in milk yields per cow. 
4 Assuming no increase in milk yields per cow, the average share of production exceeding the quota on total milk production 
is 16.4% for farms with a quota of less than 40 t, 11.0% for farms with 40 – 100 t, and 6.4% for farms with more than 100 t 
(mean of all farms in the data pool = 10.6%).   13 
payments, single farm payments, payments of the agri-environmental programme, and less favoured 
area payments). In the base-run, which simulates an average situation before the implementation of the 
2003 CAP reform, single farm payments per hectare are calculated. These payments are implemented 
in a scenario, which simulates the effects of the CAP reform (including the milk  market reform: 
introduction of a milk premium, decoupling of the milk premium, increase of milk quota endowments) 
and refers to 2008. For 2015, we distinguish between a situation with a milk quota regulation and a 
situation without a quota regulation. Price assumptions for all scenarios are provided by the Austrian 
Institute of Economic Research (Wifo). 
 
On average, farms in the data pool have reference hectares of 32.3 ha and single farm payments per 
hectare of 281.3 Euros/ha. Farms with lower entitlements are mostly organic farms, farms in very 
mountainous regions, and/or farms with less than 40 t of milk quota. Due to the CAP reform and given 
the model assumptions, most farms are better off in 2008 than in the base-run; TGMs increase by 
17.3% on average. These increases are lower in mountainous regions, for organic farms, and for farms 
with only a small endowment of milk quota. Assuming a quota regulation in 2015, TGMs for most of 
the farms in non-mountainous regions, organic farms and for most of the smaller farms with less than 
100 t of milk quota, respectively, are lower compared to 2008. One reason for this is that smaller or 
organic farms, respectively, have lower milk yields per cow relative to bigger or conventional farms.  
 
In  2015,  changes  in TGMs  between  the  scenario  with  a  quota  regulation  and  the  scenario  of  an 
abolition of milk quota are quite moderate. However, assuming high (low) milk prices, TGMs are 
higher (lower) on average without quota. Especially smaller farms (with an endowment of up to 100 t 
of milk quota) have higher TGMs, on average, without a quota regulation. Conventional farms gain 
more (loose less) on average from an abolition of the quota system compared to organic farms. From a 
regional point of view, positive (negative) changes in TGMs are highest for farms in non-mountainous 
regions,  but  almost  zero on  average  for farms  in  very  mountainous regions. One  explanation  for 
smaller farms having higher TGMs without a quota regulation than with a quota regulation is that 
especially for small farms with less than 40 t of milk quota the share of milk production exceeding the 
quota is higher than for larger farms. Without a quota, a levy on excess production (and, thus, a lower 
price  for  milk  beyond  the  quota)  becomes  obsolete,  such  that  on  average,  revenues  from  milk 
production are 4.1% higher without a quota than with a quota for farms with less than 40 t. 
 
Given  the  model  assumptions,  the  results  show  increases  in  TGMs  in  the  CAP  reform  scenario 
compared to the base-run for most of the farms in the data pool. To draw conclusions on whether 
farms are better of with or without a milk quota regulation a range of possible levels of the milk price 
in 2015 was defined, yielding different results for regional and structural aggregates. Assuming a high 
milk price, the results point into the direction that smaller farms (in terms of milk quota endowment) 
are better off if the milk quota regulation is abolished. Interpreting these results one have to take into 
account that markets for land and quotas have not be taking into account in the model so far. The 
degree of excess production beyond the quota indicates the competitiveness of dairy farms. Generally, 
milk production regularly exceeds the quota in Austria, indicating relatively low marginal costs of 
milk production in some regions (see Rosenwirth and Sinabell, 2007). In this analysis issues of the 
‘health check’ like other implementations of single farm payments (for example, using a regional   14 
approach instead o the historic approach) were not considered, which might yield different results, 
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